When You Inherit the Business, You Also Inherit a Governance System You Didn't Build.

Ask what a founder needs from the board versus what an externally hired COO or interim CEO needs, and the answer is mostly the same: trust, transparency, clear roles, well-defined decision rights.

The difference isn't what they need. It's how fast they need it.

A founder or long-tenured CEO has usually accumulated years of context with the board — watched the strategy evolve, understood why certain decisions were made, built a working rhythm with management over time. That relationship isn't always good. The decision rights aren't always well defined either. But there's history, and history does a lot of the work that formal structure doesn't have to.

An externally hired COO, interim CEO, or fractional executive doesn't get that runway.

You inherit the strategy, the expectations, the relationships, and often the problems — but not the context that created them.

At the same time, the mandate is usually urgent. You've been brought in to fix the economics, restore execution, reduce cash burn, prepare the company to scale, professionalize operations, or address something that's already visible to the board.

Limited context plus an urgent mandate. That combination creates a governance risk I don't think gets discussed enough.

The Risk Isn't Insufficient Authority

When an external operator struggles, the first question people ask is whether the board gave them enough authority.

I think there's a better question:

Did the board, the founder, and the operator ever agree on what that authority actually was?

Those aren't the same question, and I've watched them diverge more than once. Everyone believes the mandate is clear — and each person is holding a slightly different version of it. The board thinks it delegated enough. The operator believes the mandate includes all the authority needed to execute it. The founder still assumes certain decisions are implicitly theirs.

Everyone can be acting in good faith. Nothing breaks immediately.

The ambiguity shows up the moment a real decision has to get made fast.

That's why, across several CEO, COO, and board seats — and from watching other executives navigate the same terrain — I've come to believe decision rights need to be made explicit early, not discovered under pressure. At minimum, I want clear answers to:

  • What can management decide independently?

  • What requires board consultation?

  • What requires board approval?

  • What financial, strategic, or operational threshold moves a decision from one category to the next?

  • Which decisions still sit with the founder, if the founder is still active?

  • When is the board offering advice, and when is it giving direction?

That last one matters more than it sounds. A board member intends to share perspective; the operator hears an instruction. Or the reverse — management treats something as optional that the board believed it had clearly directed. Same words. Very different governance implications.

This Isn't Just an Operator's Observation

The data backs this up.

NACD's 2025 Public Company Board Practices and Oversight Survey asked directors what gets in the way of an effective board-CEO relationship. 38% cited ineffective information flow. 38% cited unclear communication of the board's expectations. 36% cited conflicting priorities. 29% cited unclear delineation between board and management roles.

None of those are problems of strategy, talent, or capital. They're problems of alignment and governance.

NACD's 2025 Blue Ribbon Commission on the board-CEO relationship reached a related conclusion — its first recommendation is to delineate board and CEO roles explicitly; its second is to define how the two will actually work together. Delegated authority is one of the specific tools it names for implementing both.

McKinsey's 2024 survey of 913 directors and executives points the same direction: unclear roles and responsibilities, poor information sharing, and lack of agenda clarity were among the leading causes of ineffective board-CEO collaboration.

None of this research specifically proves that an incoming external operator carries more governance risk than a founder or long-tenured CEO. That part comes from what I've seen firsthand. But it supports the underlying point: ambiguity about roles, expectations, and decision rights can quietly undermine a board-management relationship — and those are exactly the things an incoming operator has had the least time to build.

Formal Authority and Actual Authority Aren't Always the Same

There's another wrinkle, especially in founder-led companies.

Formal decision rights don't tell you where actual influence sits.

A founder may hold fewer formal decision rights on paper but still carry enormous weight with employees, customers, investors, and individual board members. An incoming executive who reads the org chart and assumes that's the whole picture won't be effective for long.

The reverse happens too — a board tells an incoming executive they have broad authority, then keeps intervening selectively in operating decisions anyway.

Neither is necessarily bad intent. Both create real uncertainty about who's actually accountable for the outcome.

That matters because accountability and authority need to stay roughly aligned. Hold someone accountable for an outcome while the authority to change it lies elsewhere, and no amount of operational discipline fixes that. It's a structural problem, not an execution one.

Decision Rights Matter Most When the Plan Stops Working

Ambiguity about authority rarely surfaces when the business is on plan. It shows up when:

  • a major customer is at risk;

  • cash is tighter than expected;

  • a key hire isn't working out;

  • a significant investment needs to be reconsidered;

  • a strategic assumption turns out wrong; or

  • the operating plan itself needs to change.

That's a bad moment to discover that management's read on its authority and the board's read never matched. It's also why I think the incoming operator has an obligation to force the decision-rights conversation early, rather than wait for the board to raise it.

The Threshold for Informing Isn't the Threshold for Acting

A similar distinction applies to how incoming executives communicate emerging problems.

The bar for telling the board something shouldn't be the same as the bar for recommending what to do about it.

Management should be constantly diagnosing operational problems. Boards don't need a running commentary on every uncertainty the team is chasing down. But potentially material problems are different.

My bias has always been to surface those early — while the team is still diagnosing the cause, before the solution is fully formed — rather than wait until both are neatly wrapped up. That doesn't mean escalating speculation or asking the board to solve management's problem. It means distinguishing between:

"We know enough that you should be aware of this."

And:

"We know enough to recommend what we do about it."

Those two moments rarely land at the same time.

NACD's research is worth a look here too. In its 2025 survey, nearly 74% of respondents said their CEO had openly discussed challenges, failures, or struggles with the board in the prior 12 to 18 months. Almost half said the CEO had increased the frequency of communication with the board. That doesn't prove earlier disclosure produces better outcomes. But it does suggest candid communication about unresolved problems is a common thread in stronger board-CEO relationships.

For an incoming operator, this matters more, not less — you don't have years of accumulated trust to draw on. You're building it and being judged on delivery at the same time.

In my experience, trust comes less from always having the answer and more from surfacing the right problems early and making sure the board is never surprised by something management already knew.

Clarify the Governance Before You Need It

None of this means founders have it easy with their boards, or that external executives are doomed to governance trouble. Companies, boards, founders, and mandates vary enormously.

But when an external executive is brought in specifically to change performance, one principle travels well across almost every situation I've seen:

Don't wait for a crisis to find out how the governance actually works.

Clarify the mandate. Clarify the decision rights. Clarify where the founder stays involved. Clarify the line between board advice and board direction. Clarify which developments the board wants to hear about before management has a complete answer.

Because when the mandate is urgent, governance ambiguity stops being a board-management issue.

It becomes an execution issue.

For operators, founders, investors, and board members: when you bring in an external executive to change performance materially, how explicitly do you define the boundaries of the mandate before the work even starts?

Sources

• NACD — Building a High-Trust Board-CEO Relationship

• NACD — Barriers to Building and Sustaining an Effective Board-CEO Relationship

• NACD — CEO Actions to Strengthen the Board-CEO Relationship

• McKinsey — Better Together: Three Ways to Boost Board-CEO Collaboration

Alejandro Di-Tolla

J. Alejandro Di Tolla is a Fractional COO who embeds with growth-stage companies to turn chaotic operations into scalable systems. 20+ years of C-suite experience across SaaS, healthcare, and international markets.

https://gbdsllc.com
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